Sunday, December 7, 2025
HomeRegulation and PolicyThe Coziness Problem: How Industry Influence Shaped New Zealand’s Glyphosate Decisions

The Coziness Problem: How Industry Influence Shaped New Zealand’s Glyphosate Decisions

On the surface, borrowing international science sounds efficient. But it only works if the underlying products and conditions are the same — and they’re not.

If you spend enough time reading regulatory documents, OIA responses, court filings, and the fine print of pesticide approvals, you start to notice something. Not a scandal — just a kind of gravity. A quiet closeness between regulators and the very industries they’re meant to keep in check.

In New Zealand, that closeness is easy to miss unless you’re looking for it.
It hides in shared assumptions.
In repeated phrases.
In the steady recycling of overseas conclusions.
In the unspoken belief that the system “works” — because it has always worked this way.

But when the chemical in question is the world’s most used weedkiller, and the stakes include public health, water safety, and environmental integrity, that coziness becomes more than a quirk.

It becomes a risk.

The 2017 Browning–Brunning review was the first document to lay bare how deep this problem runs. And when you compare their findings to what we’re seeing in New Zealand in 2025, the parallels become unmistakable — and deeply concerning.

So let’s talk about it.
Let’s talk about the closeness — and why it matters.

When Regulators Lean on Industry-Aligned Agencies

One of the most striking themes highlighted in the 2017 review was the Environmental Protection Authority’s (EPA) willingness to lean heavily on overseas regulators instead of conducting its own analysis.

At face value, this sounds practical.
New Zealand is a small country.
We don’t have in-house toxicology labs.
We don’t have a research institute dedicated to pesticide safety.

But here’s the problem: the agencies the EPA leaned on most — the German Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) — have since been exposed for relying on:

  • Ghostwritten Monsanto text
  • Unpublished industry studies
  • Selective evidence weighting
  • Conclusions later challenged or overturned in court

So when the EPA trusted BfR…
they were indirectly trusting Monsanto.

When they trusted EFSA…
they were trusting a process later found to be compromised.

And when the EPA repeated those conclusions in its 2016 glyphosate review…
it unknowingly imported those flaws into New Zealand’s regulatory system.

This isn’t regulatory independence.
This is regulatory outsourcing dressed up as scientific certainty.

Who the EPA Listens To — and Why It Shapes the Outcome

Regulators should be the firewall between public health and commercial interest.
But the 2017 review — and the years since — show that this firewall is thin.

The review highlighted a pattern of:

  • accepting overseas conclusions at face value
  • giving greater weight to industry studies than independent research
  • dismissing peer-reviewed evidence showing harm
  • adopting industry-friendly language (“no new evidence”, “unlikely to be carcinogenic”)
  • overlooking vulnerable population risks
  • relying on data the public cannot see

None of this is illegal.
But it is telling.

When an agency consistently uses the language of industry, accepts the assumptions of industry, and prioritises the data produced by industry, it quietly drifts closer to the very sector it is supposed to scrutinise.

This is the coziness problem in its most recognisable form.

Under-Resourced Regulators and Industry-Supplied Science

The EPA has admitted that it does not have:

  • in-house toxicologists
  • a dedicated pesticide research team
  • capability to test full formulations
  • sufficient funding to conduct independent assessments

It also recovers only around 16% of its assessment costs from chemical companies — meaning 84% of the cost of evaluating pesticides falls on the public purse or isn’t done at all.

When an agency is:

  • underfunded
  • understaffed
  • required to evaluate complex chemistry
  • operating without laboratory capability

…it is structurally pushed toward the path of least resistance.

And the path of least resistance is always:

“Use what overseas regulators said.”
“Accept the studies the company provides.”
“Assume safety unless proven otherwise.”

Not because regulators are lazy.
Not because they’re corrupt.
But because the system leaves them with no other option.

This isn’t a people problem.
It’s a design flaw.

And glyphosate merely exposes it.

The Funding Model That Keeps the EPA Dependent

Here’s the part almost no one talks about.

If the EPA charged chemical companies the full cost of assessing their products — the way most people assume they already do — the agency would actually have the resources to do what the public expects:

  • test formulations
  • demand long-term studies
  • reassess chemicals when new evidence emerges
  • question industry data rather than rely on it
  • hire toxicologists instead of outsourcing decisions overseas

But that’s not how the system works.

Right now, chemical companies pay only a small fraction of what it costs to assess their own products. The rest is absorbed by the EPA, shifted onto the public, or simply left unfunded. And when an agency can’t afford to run its own science, there’s only one place left to turn:

the companies seeking approval.

It creates a strange and uncomfortable reality:

The companies making billions from pesticide sales are not paying for the science needed to prove their products are safe.

And because the EPA isn’t fully funded to do its own testing, the regulator becomes structurally dependent on the very industry it’s meant to evaluate.

Imagine if chemical companies were required to pay the full cost — 100% — of assessing and re-assessing their products.

The EPA could finally afford to:

  • run independent toxicology
  • require full formulation studies
  • commission long-term environmental monitoring
  • challenge weak, selective, or unpublished industry data
  • update assessments when new evidence emerges instead of recycling old conclusions

In other words, the regulator could actually regulate.

But under the current model, underfunding isn’t a bug — it’s the feature that keeps the system operating exactly as industry prefers:
Reassurance over investigation.
Assumptions over scrutiny.
Borrowed science over independent evaluation.

And chemical companies continue to turn enormous profits from products that were never properly assessed in the first place.

How Global Industry Influence Filters Into New Zealand

The 2017 review briefly touched on something we rarely talk about in New Zealand: the global revolving door between agribusiness and regulators.

In the US and EU:

  • former Monsanto consultants have entered regulatory agencies
  • former regulators have gone on to work for pesticide manufacturers
  • shared language and worldview often shape assessments more than hard data

New Zealand isn’t directly part of this revolving door, but we import the consequences.

We adopt:

  • the same terminology
  • the same industry-framed assumptions
  • the same unpublished studies
  • the same risk characterisations
  • the same reassurances

And because our EPA often accepts those findings uncritically, the worldview embedded in overseas assessments becomes embedded here too — whether or not it’s grounded in independent science.

This is how industry influence travels across borders without ever having to set foot in New Zealand.

Glyphosate Formulations: The Risk the EPA Avoided

Here is where the coziness becomes visible.

The EPA did not assess:

  • Roundup®
  • Yates Zero
  • generic council sprays
  • agricultural formulations
  • surfactant blends
  • full commercial products

Instead, it assessed glyphosate as an isolated molecule — even though:

No one in New Zealand is exposed to glyphosate alone.
Not farmers.
Not council workers.
Not children on playgrounds.
Not home gardeners.

The EPA says reviewing full formulations would require:

  • more capability
  • more funding
  • more time
  • more data
  • more scrutiny
  • more independence

Industry says reviewing full formulations would require:

  • more expensive studies
  • more disclosure
  • more transparency
  • more regulatory obligations

So nothing happens.

Glyphosate the molecule gets assessed.
Glyphosate-based weedkillers get a free pass.

Regulatory convenience wins.
Public protection loses.

When Assumptions Replace Independent Science

The Browning–Brunning review showed that the EPA held a central assumption:

If other agencies say glyphosate is safe, then it must be safe.

But what if:

  • the overseas agencies were using incomplete data?
  • some studies were ghostwritten?
  • industry selectively supplied evidence?
  • key findings were dismissed?
  • formulations were never tested?

This isn’t a hypothetical.
This is exactly what court cases overseas have revealed.

And because New Zealand relied so heavily on those assessments, any flaw in the source became a flaw in ours.

Glyphosate wasn’t the problem.
The structure of decision-making was.

A Reassurance Culture — Not a Safety System

When you step back, a pattern emerges:

  • Underfunding
  • Overreliance on overseas data
  • Dependence on industry studies
  • Lack of independent toxicology
  • No formulation-level testing
  • Adoption of industry-friendly language
  • Dismissal of inconvenient science

This is not a conspiracy.
It’s a culture.

A culture where reassurance is normal.
A culture where certainty is projected even when evidence is incomplete.
A culture where the regulator mirrors the industry because it lacks the tools not to.

Easy is not the same as safe.

Where This Leaves Us — And Why the Questions Haven’t Gone Away

The 2017 review didn’t just highlight a few gaps in New Zealand’s chemical regulation — it flagged a deeper pattern. A pattern built on trust in overseas agencies, confidence in industry-supplied data, and a regulatory culture that prefers reassurance over scrutiny.

And here we are in 2025, watching the same themes resurface in the EPA’s defence of its glyphosate decisions.

The same assumptions.
The same familiar phrases.
The same missing formulation data.
The same dependence on other countries’ conclusions.

It’s hard to ignore the feeling that nothing fundamental has shifted. The problems Bruning and Browning documented weren’t historical quirks — they were symptoms of a system that was always going to circle back to the same place.

Which is why the questions they raised haven’t disappeared.
If anything, they’ve become harder to avoid.

In the final article in this series, we examine History Repeating — why the EPA’s 2025 court defence looks and sounds so much like 2017 all over again.

Mini-series: Revisiting the Glyphosate Review

This article is Part 2 of a 3-part mini-series on glyphosate regulation, industry influence, and public health oversight in New Zealand.

Part 1: The Review They Ignored — how the EPA dismissed a damning 2017 assessment of its glyphosate review process

Part 2: The Coziness Problem — (you are here)

Part 3: History Repeating — why the EPA’s 2025 court defence sounds a lot like 2017 all over again

Addendum: Missing Science — a standalone analysis examining what was included, excluded, and overlooked in the EPA’s evidence base


Resources & References

The coziness between industry and regulators didn’t emerge overnight. It developed through repeat patterns — shared language, inherited assumptions, selective evidence, and a regulatory framework that rarely looks beyond what overseas agencies have already decided.

The documents below offer a deeper look into how those patterns formed and why they still matter today.

Public Health Concern: Why Did the NZ EPA Ignore the World Authority on Cancer? [PDF]
The full 2017 review authored by Steffan Browning and Jodie Bruning, tabled before the Bay of Plenty Regional Council.

The EPA’s Glyphosate Review (2016)
New Zealand’s official response to IARC’s classification — a short, selective report that relied heavily on industry-sourced material.

International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) – Monograph 112
The 2015 WHO-linked classification that labelled glyphosate a “probable human carcinogen,” based on peer-reviewed public evidence.

The Monsanto Papers – Carey Gillam
An exposé built on leaked internal documents showing how Monsanto shaped the scientific and regulatory narrative around glyphosate.

Whitewash – Carey Gillam
Gillam’s award-winning first book, tracing 20 years of investigative journalism into glyphosate, regulatory capture, and suppressed science.

Court of Appeal to Hear Glyphosate Case – NoMoreGlyphosate.nz
Our coverage of the Environmental Law Initiative’s latest legal challenge — and what it could mean for the EPA and public trust.

When regulatory agencies absorb the language, logic, and conclusions of the industries they oversee, the outcome becomes predictable. Decisions look independent on the surface — but the foundations are anything but.

And when those same foundations reappear in 2025, unchanged after eight years, it raises a question that goes beyond glyphosate:

If the system keeps circling back to the same conclusions, is it because the science is settled — or because the structure never allowed for anything else?


Image Source & Attribution

The feature image on this page was generated using AI (ChatGPT/DALL·E) and adapted for the web using Canva.

No More Glyphosate NZ
No More Glyphosate NZ
No More Glyphosate NZ is an independent, community-funded project focused on transparency around glyphosate use, residues, and regulation in New Zealand. We investigate how pesticides, food production, and policy decisions affect public health and consumer clarity — so New Zealanders can make informed choices in a system that often hides the detail.
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